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Evolutionary games on the lattice:
death-birth updating process
Stephen Evilsizor and Nicolas Lanchier∗
Abstract This paper is concerned with the death-birth updating process. This model is
an example of a spatial game in which players located on the d-dimensional integer lattice
are characterized by one of two possible strategies and update their strategy at rate one
by mimicking one of their neighbors chosen at random with a probability proportional to the
neighbor’s payoff. To understand the role of space in the form of local interactions, the process
is compared with its nonspatial deterministic counterpart for well-mixing populations, which
is described by the replicator equation. To begin with, we prove that, provided the range
of the interactions is sufficiently large, both strategies coexist on the lattice for a parameter
region where the replicator equation also exhibits coexistence. Then, we identify parameter
regions in which there is a dominant strategy that always wins on the lattice whereas the
replicator equation displays either coexistence or bistability. Finally, we show that, for the
one-dimensional nearest neighbor system and in the parameter region corresponding to the
prisoner’s dilemma game, cooperators can win on the lattice whereas defectors always win
in well-mixing populations, thus showing that space favors cooperation. In particular, several
parameter regions where the spatial and nonspatial models disagree are identified.
1. Introduction
This paper is concerned with a closely related version of the death-birth updating process in evo-
lutionary game theory introduced in [17]. This model is an example of a spatial evolutionary game
designed based on the framework of interacting particle systems. The concept of evolutionary game
theory is an extension of traditional game theory that has been proposed by [15] to describe the
dynamics of populations in which fitness is frequency dependent: individuals are viewed as players
who are characterized by their strategy and receive a certain payoff through their interactions with
other individuals. The payoff is then interpreted as fitness so that players with a larger payoff have
a higher reproductive success. One of the most popular models of evolutionary game is the repli-
cator equation [10] which assumes that the population is well-mixing. In contrast, the death-birth
updating process includes a spatial structure in the form of local interactions: players are located
on the set of vertices of a connected graph and interact with a finite set of neighbors, meaning that
they update their strategy based on these neighbors. See [16, chapter 9] for a general definition
and a brief review of such models. The model in [17] assumes that the updates are neutral with
high probability and based on the payoff of the neighbors with small probability, which we refer
respectively as voter and game steps. In contrast, the model considered in this paper only accounts
for game steps, so the duality techniques [6] developed for voter model perturbations are no longer
available tools to study the process. The main objective is to study the limiting behavior of the spa-
tial stochastic process and confront our results with the limiting behavior of the replicator equation
in order to understand the effects of the inclusion of space.
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Model description. The process studied in this paper, which we again refer to as the death-birth
updating process following the terminology in [17], is a spin system on the d-dimensional integer
lattice where each vertex is occupied by a player characterized by one of two possible strategies,
say strategy 1 and strategy 2. The state at time t is a function
ξt : Z
d → {1, 2} where ξt(x) = strategy at vertex x at time t.
The dynamics of this process or any other spatial game is defined in a couple of steps: we first fix
a payoff matrix, which allows us to turn every spatial configuration of strategies into a so-called
payoff landscape, which can then be used to define the transition rates at each vertex. Since we
focus on games with two strategies, the payoff matrix is a 2× 2 matrix A = (aij) whose coefficients
are positive real numbers interpreted as
aij = payoff of a type i player interacting with a type j player.
In nonspatial evolutionary games, players interact equally with any other player in the population,
making their payoff a function of the global frequency of representatives of each strategy. In contrast,
spatial games assume that the payoff of a player depends exclusively on the strategy of a finite set of
neighbors, which is the key to designing more realistic models with local interactions. Throughout
this paper, the interaction neighborhood of vertex x is the set
Nx := {y ∈ Z
d : y 6= x and maxj=1,2,...,d |xj − yj| ≤M}
where the constant M is called the range of the interactions. Letting Nj(x, ξ) be the number of
neighbors of the player at vertex x following strategy j, every spatial configuration ξ is then turned
into a payoff landscape by attributing the payoff
φ(x, ξ) :=
∑
j aij Nj(x, ξ)1{ξ(x) = i} for i = 1, 2, (1)
to the player at vertex x. In words, each type i player receives aij from each of her neighbors
following strategy j. The last step to define the dynamics of the process is to follow [15] and
interpret the payoff as fitness. The basic idea here is to write the rate at which a player changes her
strategy as a function of her payoff and the payoff of her neighbors in such a way that players with
a larger payoff are more likely to spread their strategy. There are multiple options. For instance,
the updating rules considered in [9, 13] are as follows.
• Best-response dynamics [9]. Players update their strategy at rate one in order to maximize
their payoff, which depends on the strategy of their neighbors.
• Payoff affecting birth and death rates [13]. In this process, when a player has a positive payoff,
at rate this payoff, one of her neighbors chosen at random adopts her strategy, whereas when
her payoff is negative, at rate minus this payoff, she adopts the strategy of one of her neighbors
chosen at random. This updating rule is inspired from [3].
The dynamics of the death-birth updating process is built using a similar approach: we assume that
players update their strategy at rate one by mimicking a random neighbor, with each neighbor being
chosen with a probability proportional to her payoff. More precisely, letting ξ be the configuration
of the system, the player at x switches her strategy i→ j at rate
pi→j(x, ξ) :=
∑
y∈Nx
φ(y, ξ) 1{ξ(y) = j}∑
y∈Nx
φ(y, ξ)
for {i, j} = {1, 2}. (2)
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This model, or to be more specific, a closely related version of this model, has been introduced
and studied heuristically in [17] while [4, 6] give rigorous results. The process considered in these
works can be seen as the weak selection approximation of the model described by (2). Players again
update their strategy at rate one but, at the time of the update,
• with probability 1 − ǫ, the player mimics the strategy of a neighbor chosen uniformly at
random, just like in the voter model [5, 11], while
• with probability ǫ, the player mimics a neighbor chosen at random according to probabilities
that are proportional to the neighbors’ payoff, as described by (2).
This model is studied in [4, 6, 17] when ǫ is small, in which case duality techniques for voter model
perturbations are available. In contrast, we study the process when ǫ = 1, in which case duality
cannot be used, which leads to more qualitative and less quantitative results.
The replicator equation. Before studying the spatial game, it is worth taking a quick look at
its nonspatial deterministic analog to later identify disagreements between both models and thus
understand the effect of the inclusion of space in the form of local interactions. The nonspatial model
is obtained by assuming that the population of players is well-mixing, which results in a system
of ordinary differential equations for the frequency of each strategy. In the case of the death-birth
process, this is a time-change of the replicator equation:
u′1 = u1 u2 (φ1(u1, u2)− φ2(u1, u2)) (3)
where uj is the frequency of players following strategy j and
φ1(u1, u2) = a11u1 + a12u2 and φ2(u1, u2) = a21u1 + a22u2
are the common payoffs of all type 1 and all type 2 players, respectively. This can be viewed as the
nonspatial analog of the payoff landscape (1). As pointed out in [12], the limiting behavior can be
conveniently described by introducing the parameters
a1 := a11 − a21 and a2 := a22 − a12
and calling strategy i selfish whenever ai > 0 and altruistic whenever ai < 0. Then, following the
usual terminology by calling a strategy an evolutionary stable strategy if it cannot be invaded by
any alternative strategy starting at an infinitesimally small frequency, some basic algebra shows
that the behavior of the replicator equation (3) is as follows:
• when a1 a2 < 0, the selfish strategy always outcompetes the altruistic strategy, showing that
the selfish strategy is the only evolutionary stable strategy,
• when a1, a2 > 0, there is an unstable interior fixed point so the system is bistable, showing
that the two (selfish) strategies are evolutionary stable,
• when a1, a2 < 0, there is a globally stable interior fixed point so both strategies coexist and
none of the two (altruistic) strategies is evolutionary stable.
In summary, the analysis of the replicator equation shows that, when the population is well-mixing,
a strategy is an evolutionary stable strategy if it is selfish but not if it is altruistic.
Main results for the spatial game. In order to compare the spatial game with its nonspatial
analog, we assume that the process starts from a spatially homogeneous distribution, i.e., a product
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measure in which the density of each of the two strategies is constant across the lattice. Since the
two configurations in which all players follow the same strategy are absorbing states, we also assume,
to avoid trivialities, that the density of each strategy is positive. For the spatial game,
• strategy j wins when limt→∞ P (ξt(x) = j) = 1,
• strategy j survives when lim inft→∞ P (ξt(x) = j) > 0,
a strategy is said to go extinct when it does not survive and both strategies are said to coexist when
they both survive. Note that the two probabilities above do not depend on the choice of vertex x
because both the initial distribution and the evolution rules are translation invariant. From now
on, we assume without loss of generality that a21 > a12 > 0 and study the limiting behavior of the
process as the other two payoffs vary.
To begin with, we look at the parameter region where both strategies are altruistic, in which case
coexistence occurs when the population is well-mixing. Numerical simulations suggest that, except
in the one-dimensional nearest neighbor case, coexistence is again possible for the spatial game
though the coexistence region is reduced. The smaller the spatial dimension and/or the range of
the interactions, the smaller the coexistence region. Our first two theorems show that coexistence
is indeed possible and that the coexistence region for the spatial game is indeed reduced. More
precisely, Theorem 1 shows that, regardless of the spatial dimension, both strategies coexist when
they are sufficiently altruistic and the range of the interactions is sufficiently large.
Theorem 1 – There is a > 0 such that coexistence occurs when
max (a11, a22) ≤ a and M is sufficiently large.
To prove that the coexistence region is reduced, and more generally identify parameter regions
in which one strategy wins, we first observe that, when a11 = a12 and a22 = a21, the process is
significantly simplified because the payoff of the players only depends on their strategy but not on
the strategy of their neighbors. Indeed, in this case (1) reduces to
φ(x, ξ) =
∑
j aij Nj(x, ξ)1{ξ(x) = i} = aii ((2M + 1)
d − 1)1{ξ(x) = i}
for i = 1, 2, therefore the transition rates become
pi→j(x, ξ) =
∑
y∈Nx
φ(y, ξ) 1{ξ(y) = j}∑
y∈Nx
φ(y, ξ)
=
ajj Nj(x, ξ)
aiiNi(x, ξ) + ajj Nj(x, ξ)
for {i, j} = {1, 2}. It follows that, under our general assumption a12 < a21, the set of type 2 players
dominates stochastically a certain biased voter model [1, 2], thus showing that, in this very special
case, strategy 2 wins. Elaborating on this idea but using coupling arguments to compare the death-
birth updating process with spin systems which are more complicated than the biased voter model,
we can prove much more, as shown in the next theorem.
Theorem 2 – Recall that a21 > a12 and let N := cardNx. Then,
(a) strategy 1 wins when min (a12 − a22, a11 − a21) > (N − 1)(a21 − a12),
(b) strategy 2 wins when (M,d) 6= (1, 1) and
(N2 −N − 1) max (a11 − a21, a12 − a22, a11 − a22) < a21 − a12.
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Figure 1 shows the parameter regions in both parts of the theorem. Note that the parameter region
in the first part of the theorem is nonempty if and only if
a12 − (N − 1)(a21 − a12) > 0 if and only if a12 > (1− 1/N) a21.
The figure shows this region for N = 2, i.e., in the presence of one-dimensional nearest neighbor
interactions. In contrast, the parameter region in the second part of the theorem is always nonempty
and, more interestingly, it always overlaps the region where both strategies are altruistic as well as
the region where both strategies are selfish. This shows that the inclusion of a spatial structure in
the form of local interactions indeed reduces the coexistence region, as mentioned above. This also
shows that, in a subset of the parameter region where the replicator equation is bistable, there is
instead a strong type for the spatial game that wins even starting at low density. The next theorem
goes a little bit further in this direction by showing that, no matter how selfish a strategy is, the
other strategy always wins if it is selfish enough.
Theorem 3 – For all a > 0 there is A <∞ such that strategy 1 wins when
max (a21, a22) ≤ a and a11 > A.
Note that, contrary to Theorem 2, this theorem does not assume that a12 < a21, therefore it also
extends the parameter region where strategy 2 wins found before.
The results collected so far indicate interesting discrepancies between the death-birth updating
process and the replicator equation, showing the importance of local interactions. The most inter-
esting aspect suggested by spatial simulations is the existence of a subset of the parameter region
corresponding to the prisoner’s dilemma game in which cooperators win on the lattice whereas they
always lose when the population is well-mixing. The prisoner’s dilemma game is characterized by
the following ordering and terminology of the four payoffs:
a12 = sucker’s payoff < a22 = punishment
< a11 = reward < a21 = temptation.
Figure 2 shows the corresponding triangular region in solid lines. Players with strategy 1 are called
cooperators while players with strategy 2 are called defectors. Because the reward is not as good as
the temptation, and the punishment is not as bad as the sucker’s payoff, cooperators are altruistic
and defectors selfish, therefore defectors indeed win when the population is well-mixing. In contrast,
the heuristic arguments in [17] suggest that there is a subset of the prisoner’s dilemma triangle in
which cooperators are favored over defectors on regular graphs. This has been proved in [4] for
finite, connected, simple graphs, and in [6] for integer lattices with d > 2. Their results, however,
hold in the weak selection case but not for the process (2). We now study the interactions among
cooperators and defectors in one dimension, the main difficulty being the lack of attractiveness of
the process. To state our last result, we introduce the following quantities that will be interpreted
later as drift of a certain interface:
D3 :=
a11 + a12
a11 + a12 + a21 + a22
−
a21 + a22
2a11 + a21 + a22
D4 :=
a11 + a12
a11 + a12 + 2a22
−
a21 + a22
2a11 + a21 + a22
.
Then, we have the following theorem.
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Figure 1. Phase diagram of the spatial game along with a summary of the theorems in the a11 − a22 plane. In the
picture, the points p− and p+ are the two points introduced in the proof of Lemma 11.
Theorem 4 – Assume M = d = 1. Then, strategy 1 wins when
(a22 < a21 and D3 +D4 > 0) or (a22 > a21 and D4 > 0).
Note that the parameter region given by the theorem overlaps but is not restricted to the prisoner’s
dilemma triangle. To see that the theorem implies the existence of a subset of the triangle in which
cooperators win, observe that, when a11 = a21 > a22 = a12,
D3 +D4 =
1
2
+
a12 + a21
3a12 + a21
− 2×
a12 + a21
a12 + 3a21
>
1
2
+
1
2
− 2×
1
2
= 0.
In particular, the first parameter region given by the theorem in which cooperators win indeed
overlap the prisoner’s dilemma triangle. The theorem also implies that strategy 2 wins in the
parameter regions obtained by exchanging the role of the two strategies. Noticing in addition the
symmetry in the expression of D4, we deduce from the second part of the theorem that
strategy 1 wins when a22 > a21 and D4 > 0
strategy 2 wins when a11 > a12 and D4 < 0
showing that, when min(a11, a22) > max(a12, a21), the condition is sharp. Figure 2 gives a picture
of the curves derived from the theorem when a21/a12 = 2.
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Figure 2. Phase diagram of the one-dimensional nearest neighbor spatial game when a21/a12 = 2. The curves are
obtained from the conditions in Theorem 4 and their symmetric expressions. The triangle in solid lines represents
the parameter region corresponding to the prisoner’s dilemma game.
2. Coexistence of altruistic strategies
This section is devoted to the proof of our coexistence result Theorem 1. For simplicity, we focus on
the two-dimensional case but our approach easily extends to any spatial dimensions. Specifically,
we will prove that both strategies coexist when M is large and
max (a11, a22) ≤ 5
−2 2−21 (c−)
5 min (a12, a21) = 2
−14 (c+)
−1 min (a12, a21) (4)
where the two key constants c− and c+ are defined as
c− := 2
−17 min (a12/a21, a21/a12) and c+ := 5
2 27(c−)
−5. (5)
Let s := ln(2) and Kr := [−rM, rM)
2 for all r > 0, and fix
A,B ⊂ K1/2 with card(A) = card(B) = 2
−2M2.
The proofs of Lemmas 6–7 below hold for such general sets though they will be applied ultimately
to more specific space-time boxes. One key to the proof is to observe that
maxj=1,2 |xj − yj| ≤M for all (x, y) ∈ A×B.
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For all D ⊂ Z2 finite and i = 1, 2, we let
ζ it(D) := card {x ∈ D : ξt(x) = i}
denote the number of type i players in the set D at time t.
Keeping the players in a box – To begin with, we prove in the next lemma that, the number
of players of either type in a given spatial region does not decrease too fast. The idea is to simply
find a bound for the number of updates using standard large deviation estimates for the binomial
random variable. This lemma will be used repeatedly later.
Lemma 5 – For all D ⊂ Z2 finite, n ∈ N and i = 1, 2,
P (ζ it(D) ≤ 2
−(n+1)K for some t ∈ (0, ns) | ζ i0(D) ≥ K) ≤ exp(−2
−(n+3)K).
Proof. To begin with, we let
ui(D) := card {x ∈ D : ξ0(x) = i and T1(x) < ns}
denote the total number of players in the set D who are initially of type i and update their
strategy at least once by time ns. Recalling that the random variables T1(x) are independent and
exponentially distributed with rate one, our choice of s implies that
ui(D) = Binomial (ζ
i
0(D), 1− e
−ns) = Binomial (ζ i0(D), 1− 2
−n).
In particular, using the large deviation estimate
P (Binomial (K, p) ≤ K (p− z)) ≤ exp(−Kz2/2p) for all z ∈ (0, p) (6)
with p = 2−n and z = 2−(n+1), we get
P (ζ it(D) ≤ 2
−(n+1)K for some time t ∈ (0, ns) | ζ i0(D) ≥ K)
≤ P (ui(D) ≥ (1− 2
−(n+1))K | ζ i0(D) = K)
= P (Binomial (K, 1 − 2−n) ≥ (1− 2−(n+1))K)
= P (Binomial (K, 2−n) ≤ 2−(n+1)K) ≤ exp(−2−(n+3)K).
This completes the proof of the lemma. 
Moving the players around – We now prove that if the region A has a large number of type 1
players then, regardless of the configuration around this region, we can “move” a positive fraction
of these players to the nearby region B in s units of time. The constant c− defined in (5) will play
the role of the fraction of players we can move.
Lemma 6 – Assume (4) and let c− as in (5) and a > 0. Then,
P (ζ1s (B) ≤ c−(aM) | ζ
1
0 (A) ≥ aM) ≤ exp(−(aM)
1/2) for all M large.
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Proof. Applying Lemma 5 with n = 1 and K = aM , we get
P (ζ1s (B) ≤ c−(aM) | ζ
1
0 (A) ≥ aM and ζ
1
0 (B) ≥ aM)
≤ P (ζ1t (B) ≤ 2
−2(aM) for some t ∈ (0, s) | ζ10 (A) ≥ aM and ζ
1
0 (B) ≥ aM)
≤ exp(−2−4 aM) ≤ exp(−(aM)1/2)
for all M large. It remains to prove that
P (ζ1s (B) ≤ c−(aM) | ζ
1
0 (B) ≤ aM ≤ ζ
1
0 (A)) ≤ exp(−(aM)
1/2) (7)
for all M large. To lighten the notation, we let
P ∗(E) := P (E | ζ10(B) ≤ aM ≤ ζ
1
0 (A)) for any event E
and introduce the two events
A := {ζ1t (A) ≤ 2
−2 aM for some time t ∈ (0, s)}
B := {ζ2t (B) ≤ 2
−5M2 for some time t ∈ (0, s)}.
(8)
Applying Lemma 5 with K = aM then K = 2−3M2, we get
P ∗(A) ≤ exp(−2−4 aM) and P ∗(B) ≤ exp(−2−7M2). (9)
In addition, observing that the conditional payoff of each type 1 player in the set A given that the
number of type 2 players in the set B is large satisfies
φ(x | ξt(x) = 1,B
c) ≥ a12 2
−5M2 for all t ∈ (0, s)
we deduce that, on the event (A ∪B)c, each time a player in the set B updates her strategy, she
remains/becomes of type 1 with probability at least
p1 ≥ (a12 2
−5M2)(2−2 aM)((a12 2
−5M2)(2−2 aM) + (a21 + a22)(2M + 1)
4)−1
≥ (a12 2
−5M2)(2−2 aM)(a21 2
5M4)−1 ≥ 2−12 (a12/a21) aM
−1
≥ 25 c−(aM
−1)
(10)
for all M large. In particular, letting
Xu := card {x ∈ B : T1(x) < s}
X1 := card {x ∈ B : T1(x) < s and ξs(x) = 1}
(11)
observing from (10) that 2−5M2 p1 ≥ c−(aM), and using (6), we deduce that
P (X1 ≤ c−(aM) | (A ∪B)
c)
≤ P (Xu ≤ 2
−4M2) + P (X1 ≤ c−(aM) | (A ∪B)
c and Xu > 2
−4M2)
≤ P (Binomial (M2/4, 1/2) ≤ 2−4M2) + P (Binomial (2−4M2, p1) ≤ c−(aM))
≤ P (Binomial (M2/4, 1/2) ≤ 2−4M2) + P (Binomial (2−4M2, p1) ≤ 2
−5M2 p1)
≤ exp(−2−6M2) + exp(−2−7M2 p1) ≤ (1/2) exp(−(aM)
1/2).
(12)
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−M/2 M/2−5M/2
B5 = B
K5/2
5M/2−3M/2 3M/2
B0
B1
B2
B3
K1/2B4
Figure 3. Picture related to the proof of Lemma 7.
Using that X1 ≤ ζ
1
s (B) and combining (9) and (12), we conclude that
P ∗(ζ1s (B) ≤ c−(aM)) ≤ P
∗(A ∪B) + P (ζ1s (B) ≤ c−(aM) | (A ∪B)
c)
≤ P ∗(A) + P ∗(B) + P (X1 ≤ c−(aM) | (A ∪B)
c)
≤ exp(−2−4 aM) + exp(−2−7M2) + (1/2) exp(−(aM)1/2) ≤ exp(−(aM)1/2)
for all M large, which gives (7). This completes the proof. 
Creating a pile of players – The next lemma improves the previous one by showing that if the
region A has a large number of type 1 players then the same amount of type 1 players can be
created in the nearby region B. The idea is to first prove that, as long as the number of type 1
players nearby is small, the number of such players can be increased by a factor c+. Once this
threshold is reached, one can find a small box with a large number of type 1 players and apply the
previous lemma repeatedly to move a fraction of these players to the target set B.
Lemma 7 – Assume that (4) holds. Then,
P (ζ16s(B) ≤M | ζ
1
0 (A) ≥M) ≤ exp(−M
1/2) for all M large.
Proof. To keep track of the amount of type 1 and type 2 players in K5/2, which is the key to
controlling the payoff of the type 1 players in the set A, we set
K := {ζ1t (K5/2) ≥ c+M for some time t ∈ (0, s)}
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where c+ has been defined in (5). The proof is divided into two steps.
Step 1 – First, we prove that the event K occurs with probability close to one. The idea is to show
that the complement of this event confers a large payoff to the type 1 players in A, which results in
a large production of such players with high probability, thus leading to a contradiction. To make
this argument precise, we observe that, with probability one,
ζ2t (x+K1) ≥M
2 for all x ∈ A and ζ1t (K5/2) ≤ c+M
on the event Kc and for all t ∈ (0, s).
φ(x | ξt(x) = 1,K
c) ≥ a12M
2 for all x ∈ A
φ(x | ξt(x) = 2,K
c) ≤ a21 c+M + a22 (2M + 1)
2 ≤ 23 a22M
2 for all x ∈ K3/2.
In particular, given (A′ ∪K)c where A′ is the first event (8) for a = 1, each time a player in B
updates her strategy, she remains/becomes of type 1 with probability at least
q1 ≥ (a12M
2)(2−2M)((a12M
2)(2−2M) + (23 a22M
2)(2M + 1)2)−1
≥ (a12M
2)(2−2M)((24 a22M
2)(2M + 1)2)−1
≥ 2−9 (a12/a22)M
−1.
(13)
Defining Xu and X1 as in (11), observing that, by (4) and (13),
2−5M2 q1 ≥ 2
−14 (a12/a22)M ≥ c+M
and using (6), we deduce that, for all M sufficiently large,
P (X1 ≤ c+M | (A
′ ∪K)c)
≤ P (Xu ≤ 2
−4M2) + P (X1 ≤ c+M | (A
′ ∪K)c and Xu > 2
−4M2)
≤ P (Binomial (M2/4, 1/2) ≤ 2−4M2) + P (Binomial (2−4M2, q1) ≤ c+M)
≤ P (Binomial (M2/4, 1/2) ≤ 2−4M2) + P (Binomial (2−4M2, q1) ≤ 2
−5M2 q1)
≤ exp(−2−6M2) + exp(−2−7M2 q1) ≤ (1/4) exp(−M
1/2).
(14)
Using again X1 ≤ ζ
1
s (B) and combining (9) with a = 1 and (14), we get
P (Kc | ζ10 (A) ≥M) = P (ζ
1
s (B) ≤ c+M and K
c | ζ10 (A) ≥M)
≤ P (A′ | ζ10(A) ≥M) + P (ζ
1
s (B) ≤ c+M | (A
′ ∪K)c)
≤ exp(−2−4M) + (1/4) exp(−M1/2)
≤ (1/2) exp(−M1/2)
(15)
for all dispersal range M sufficiently large.
Step 2 – Now, given K, there is a box with at least 5−2 c+M type 1 players. One can move a
fraction of these players to the target set B in at most five steps, applying Lemma 6. To begin
with, we observe that some basic geometry implies that, given K, there exist
B0, . . . , B5 ⊂ K5/2 and t0 ∈ (0, s)
such that the following three conditions hold:
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(a) We have ζ1t0(B0) ≥ 5
−2 c+M .
(b) For k = 0, . . . , 5, we have card(Bk) = 2
−2M2 with B5 = B.
(c) For k = 0, . . . , 4, we have maxj=1,2 |xj − yj | ≤M for all (x, y) ∈ Bk ×Bk+1.
We refer to Figure 3 for an illustration of the worst case scenario where all the type 1 players are
located in one of the corners of K5/2. Under these conditions, we can bring type 1 players to our
target set in at most five steps applying repeatedly Lemma 6. Indeed,
P (ζ1t (B) ≤ 2
7M for all t ∈ (0, 6s) | K)
≤ P (ζ1t0+5s(B5) ≤ 2
7M | ζ1t0(B0) ≥ 5
−2 c+M = 2
7(c−)
−5M)
≤ 1−
∏
k=0,1,2,3,4 P (ζ
1
s (Bk+1) ≥ 2
7(c−)
k−4M | ζ10(Bk) ≥ 2
7(c−)
k−5M)
≤ 1−
∏
k=0,1,2,3,4 (1 − exp(−2
7/2 (c−)
(k−5)/2M1/2))
≤ 1− (1− exp(−27/2M1/2))5
≤ 5× exp(−27/2M1/2) ≤ (1/4) exp(−M1/2)
(16)
for all dispersal range M sufficiently large.
Conclusion – Combining (15)–(16), we deduce that
P (ζ1t (B) ≤ 2
7M for all t ∈ (0, 6s) | ζ10 (A) ≥M)
≤ P (Kc | ζ10 (A) ≥M) + P (ζ
1
t (B) ≤ 2
7M for all t ∈ (0, 6s) | K)
≤ (1/2) exp(−M1/2) + (1/4) exp(−M1/2) = (3/4) exp(−M1/2)
which, applying Lemma 5 with n = 6 and K = 27M , implies that
P (ζ16s(B) ≤M | ζ
1
0 (A) ≥M)
≤ P (ζ1t (B) ≤ 2
7M for all t ∈ (0, 6s) | ζ10 (A) ≥M)
+ P (ζ16s(B) ≤ 2
−7 27M | ζ1t (B) ≥ 2
7M for some t ∈ (0, 6s))
≤ (3/4) exp(−M1/2) + exp(−2−2M) ≤ exp(−M1/2)
for all M large. This completes the proof. 
Block construction – To deduce coexistence, we use Lemma 7 in combination with some obvious
symmetry and a block construction. The idea of the block construction is to define a coupling
between the process under consideration properly rescaled in space and time and supercritical
percolation. More precisely, let H be the directed graph with vertex set
H := {(z, n) ∈ Z2 × Z+ : z1 + z2 + n is even}
and in which there is an oriented edge
(z, n)→ (z′, n′) if and only if (z′ = z ± e1 or z
′ = z ± e2) and n
′ = n+ 1
where ej is the jth unit vector. Then, we consider the 14 dependent oriented site percolation process
with density equal to 1− ǫ on this directed graph, i.e., we assume that
P ((zi, ni) is closed for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m) = ǫ
m
Death-birth updating process 13
whenever |zi − zj | ∨ |ni − nj| > 14 for i 6= j. Then, we set
Bz := (M/2) z + [−M/4,M/4)
2 for all z ∈ Z2 and T := 6s = 6 ln(2)
and declare site (z, n) ∈ H to be good whenever
ζ inT (Bz) = card {x ∈ Bz : ξnT (x) = i} ≥M for i = 1, 2.
Finally, for all n ∈ N, we define
W ǫn := {z : (z, n) is wet} and Xn := {z : (z, n) is good}.
The next lemma shows that, for all ǫ > 0, one can find a sufficiently large dispersal range such that
the set of good sites dominates stochastically the set of wet sites. In view of the definition of a good
site, this will imply coexistence of both strategies.
Lemma 8 – Assume (4) and fix ǫ > 0. Then, for all M large,
P (z ∈W ǫn) ≤ P (z ∈ Xn) for all (z, n) ∈ H whenever W
ǫ
0 ⊂ X0.
Proof. First, we define the collection of events
Bi(z, n) := {ζ
i
nT (Bz) ≥M} for all (z, n) ∈ H and i = 1, 2.
Then, since for j = 1, 2,
Bz, Bz±ej ⊂ ((M/2) z ± (M/4) ej) +K1/2 and card(Bz) = card(Bz±ej ) = 2
−2M2
we can apply Lemma 7 to get
P (B1(z ± ej , n+ 1) for j = 1, 2 | B1(z, n))
= P (ζ1(n+1)T (Bz±ej) ≥M for j = 1, 2 | ζ
1
nT (Bz) ≥M)
≥ 1− 4× P (ζ1(n+1)T (Bz+e1) ≥M | ζ
1
nT (Bz) ≥M) ≥ 1− 4× exp(−M
1/2)
≥ 1− ǫ/2
for all M large. By symmetry, the same holds for strategy 2, therefore
P (z ± ej ∈ Xn+1 for j = 1, 2 | z ∈ Xn)
= P (B1(z ± ej , n+ 1) ∩B2(z ± ej , n+ 1) for j = 1, 2 | B1(z, n) ∩B2(z, n))
≥ − 1 + P (B1(z ± ej , n+ 1) for j = 1, 2 | B1(z, n) ∩B2(z, n))
+ P (B2(z ± ej , n+ 1) for j = 1, 2 | B1(z, n) ∩B2(z, n))
≥ − 1 + 2 (1 − ǫ/2) = 1− ǫ.
(17)
Since in addition all the estimates in Lemma 7 hold regardless of the configuration outside the
spatial region K5/2, we deduce from (17) the existence of a collection of events
G(z, n) for all (z, n) ∈ H
that satisfy the following three properties:
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(a) The event G(z, n) is measurable with respect to the graphical representation in
R(z, n) := ((M/2)z, nT ) + (K7/2 × [0, T ]).
(b) For all M large, we have P (G(z, n)) ≥ 1− ǫ.
(c) We have the inclusion G(z, n) ∩ {z ∈ Xn} ⊂ {z ± ej ∈ Xn+1 for j = 1, 2}.
Observing also that
R(z, n) ∩R(z′, n′) = ∅ when |z − z′| ∨ |n− n′| ≥ 2× 7 = 14,
we deduce from [8, Theorem 4.3] the existence of a coupling between the long range death-birth
process and the oriented site percolation process such that
P (W ǫn ⊂ Xn) = 1 whenever W
ǫ
0 ⊂ X0.
The lemma directly follows from the existence of this coupling. 
To conclude, we fix ǫ > 0 small enough to make the percolation process supercritical. Observ-
ing that, starting from a product measure with a positive density of both strategies, the number of
good sites at level zero is almost surely infinite, we deduce that
lim infn→∞ P (0 ∈W2n | W0 = X0) > 0.
This, together with Lemma 8, implies that, for all M large,
lim inft→∞ P (ξt(x) = 1)P (ξt(x) = 2)
= lim inft→∞ P (ξt(0) = 1)P (ξt(0) = 2)
≥ lim inft→∞
∏
i=1,2 P (ξt(0) = i | 0 ∈W2⌊t/T ⌋)P (0 ∈W2⌊t/T ⌋ | W0 = X0) > 0
for all x ∈ Z2. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
3. Coupling with modified voter models
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 2. The common ingredient to prove both parts of
the theorem is to couple the process with the modified voter models ζ1t and ζ
2
t whose transitions
at vertex x are given by the following expressions
i → j at rate ci→j(x, ζ
i) := (1− ǫ) fj(x, ζ
i) + ǫ 1{fi(x, ζ
i) = 0}
j → i at rate cj→i(x, ζ
i) := (1− ǫ) fi(x, ζ
i) + ǫ 1{fi(x, ζ
i) 6= 0}.
for {i, j} = {1, 2} and where
fj(x, ζ
i) = card {y ∈ Nx : ζ
i(x) = j}/ cardNx = (1/N)Nj(x, ζ
i)
denotes the fraction of neighbors of vertex x in state j. In words, the transition rates indicate that
particles are updated at rate one and that, at the time of an update,
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• with probability 1− ǫ > 0, the new type is chosen uniformly at random from the interaction
neighborhood just like in the voter model,
• with probability ǫ > 0, the new type is i unless all the neighbors are of type j.
The results of [12, section 3] show using duality that type i particles win for this process. In
particular, to prove that strategy 1 wins, it suffices to prove that the set of type 1 players in the
death-birth process dominates stochastically its counterpart in ζ1t , which follows from
ξ ≤ ζ1 and ξ(x) = ζ1(x) implies that
p1→2(x, ξ) ≤ c1→2(x, ζ
1) and p2→1(x, ξ) ≥ c2→1(x, ζ
1)
according to Theorem III.1.5 in [14]. Since in addition the transition rates of the modified voter
models are monotone with respect to the number of neighbors of each type, in order to show that
strategy 1 wins, it suffices to prove that the simplified implication
N1(x, ξ) = N1(x, ζ
1) and ξ(x) = ζ1(x) implies that
p1→2(x, ξ) ≤ c1→2(x, ζ
1) and p2→1(x, ξ) ≥ c2→1(x, ζ
1)
(18)
holds for some ǫ > 0. By symmetry, strategy 2 wins if the implication
N2(x, ξ) = N2(x, ζ
2) and ξ(x) = ζ2(x) implies that
p1→2(x, ξ) ≥ c1→2(x, ζ
2) and p2→1(x, ξ) ≤ c2→1(x, ζ
2)
(19)
holds for some ǫ > 0. Using (18), we now prove Theorem 2.a.
Lemma 9 – Recall that a21 > a12. Then, strategy 1 wins when
min (a12 − a22, a11 − a21) > (N − 1)(a21 − a12).
Proof. In view of the discussion above, it suffices to prove that (18) holds. First, we observe that,
when the fraction of type 1 neighbors of vertex x is equal to either zero or one, the transition rates
are the same for both processes so it remains to prove (18) under the assumption
N1N2 6= 0 where Nj := Nj(x, ξ) = Nj(x, ζ
1) for j = 1, 2. (20)
The transition rate at vertex x depends on the payoff of its neighbors, and the main idea is to
express the transition rates by distinguishing between the part of the payoff coming from x and the
part of the payoff coming from the other neighbors’ neighbors. In order to make this distinction,
we introduce the following four weighting factors:
wij :=
∑
y∼x (1{ξ(y) = i}
∑
z∼y,z 6=x 1{ξ(z) = j}) for i, j = 1, 2.
That is, wij is the number of type j neighbors (excluding vertex x) of a type i neighbor of vertex x
counted with order of multiplicity. Note that, for i = 1, 2, we have
Ni +
∑
j=1,2 wij = Ni +
∑
y∼x (1{ξ(y) = i}
∑
z∼y 1{z 6= x})
= Ni + (N − 1)
∑
y∼x 1{ξ(y) = i}
= Ni + (N − 1)Ni = NNi.
(21)
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In addition, for i 6= j, the transition rates can be expressed as
pi→j(x, ξ) =
(Nj + wji) aji + wjj ajj
(Ni + wii) aii + wij aij + (Nj + wji) aji +wjj ajj
. (22)
Using (21)–(22), we now prove that (18) holds in the nontrivial case (20).
Transition 1→ 2 – Using (21) and a22 < a12 < a21, we get
(N2 +w21) a21 + w22 a22 ≤ (N2 + w21 + w22) a21 = NN2 a21
(N1 +w11) a11 + w12 a12 = (N1 + w11 + w12) a11 + w12 (a12 − a11)
= NN1 a11 + w12 (a12 − a11).
This, together with (22) for i = 1 and j = 2, implies that
p1→2(x, ξ) ≤
NN2 a21
NN1 a11 + w12 (a12 − a11) +NN2 a21
=
NN2 a21
NN1 (a11 − a21) + w12 (a12 − a11) +N2 a21
=
NN2 a21
N2a21 + ρ1
(23)
where, since a11 − a21 > (N − 1)(a21 − a12),
ρ1 := NN1 (a11 − a21) + w12 (a12 − a11)
= (NN1 − w12)(a11 − a21) + w12 (a12 − a21)
> (N − 1)(NN1 − w12)(a21 − a12) + w12 (a12 − a21)
= N ((N − 1)N1 − w12)(a21 − a12) = N w11 (a21 − a12) ≥ 0.
(24)
Note that the strict inequality holds because (20)–(21) imply that
NN1 − w12 = (N1 + w11 + w12)− w12 = N1 +w11 ≥ N1 > 0.
In view of (23)–(24), there exists ǫ1 > 0 small such that
p1→2(x, ξ) ≤ NN2 a21 (N
2a21 + ρ1)
−1 = N2 (N + (ρ1/Na21))
−1
≤ (1− ǫ) f2(x, ξ) = (1− ǫ) f2(x, ζ
1) = c1→2(x, ζ
1)
whenever ǫ < ǫ1 and (20) holds.
Transition 2→ 1 – Since a11 > a21 > a12 and a22 − a12 < (N − 1)(a12 − a21), using the previous
estimates and obvious symmetry, we show that
p2→1(x, ξ) ≥ NN1 a12 (N
2a12 + ρ2)
−1 where ρ2 < N w22 (a12 − a21) ≤ 0.
In particular, there exists ǫ2 > 0 small such that
p2→1(x, ξ) ≥ N1 (N + (ρ2/Na12))
−1
≥ (1− ǫ) f1(x, ξ) + ǫ = (1− ǫ) f1(x, ζ
1) + ǫ = c2→1(x, ζ
1)
whenever ǫ < ǫ2 and (20) holds.
In conclusion, the implication (18) holds for ǫ smaller than min (ǫ1, ǫ2) > 0, which shows that
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strategy 1 wins under the assumptions of the lemma. 
Repeating the proof of Lemma 9 step by step but exchanging the role of both strategies only
shows that strategy 2 wins under the strong assumption a11 < a12 < a21 < a22. In fact, this
sufficient condition for strategy 2 to win can be easily improved to
max (a11, a12) < min (a21, a22)
by using a coupling between the death-birth process and a biased voter model with a selective
advantage for type 2 particles to show that the former dominates the latter. To prove that strategy 2
wins in the larger region stated in Theorem 2.b, we couple the death-birth process with the second
modified voter model ζ2t but using techniques different from the ones used to show the first part
of the theorem. To explain the assumptions of the theorem, we note that our approach requires
the interaction neighborhood to have a certain connectivity property which does not hold in the
one-dimensional nearest neighbor case. First, we introduce the payoff functions
φ1(z) := a11 (z/N) + a12 (1− z/N) = (a11 − a12)(z/N) + a12
φ2(z) := a22 (z/N) + a21 (1− z/N) = (a22 − a21)(z/N) + a21
for all z = 0, 1, . . . , N , and let a := max (a11, a12, a21, a22) and
M+ := maxz φ1(z) ≥ maxz 6=N φ1(z) =:M−
m− := minz φ2(z) ≤ minz 6=N φ2(z) =: m+.
The following lemma gives a sufficient condition on these minimum and maximum payoffs for
strategy 2 to win. This condition is made more explicit in the subsequent lemma.
Lemma 10 – Strategy 2 wins whenever (M,d) 6= (1, 1) and
(N − 1)m+ > (N − 2)M+ +M− and (N − 1)M− < (N − 2)m− +m+. (25)
Proof. Following as in the proof of Lemma 9, it suffices to show that (19) holds. This is again
trivial when the fraction of type 1 neighbors of vertex x is equal to either zero or one so we focus
from now on on the nontrivial case where
N1N2 6= 0 where Nj := Nj(x, ξ) = Nj(x, ζ
2) for j = 1, 2, (26)
indicating that x has two neighbors y∗ and z∗ with different strategies. Except in the one-dimensional
nearest neighbor case M = d = 1, one can find two vertices y∗ and z∗ such that
y∗, z∗ 6= x and y∗ ∈ Nx ∩Ny∗ and z∗ ∈ Nx ∩Nz∗ and y∗ ∈ Nz∗
and we may assume that y∗ and z∗ are neighbors of each other:
ξ(y∗) = 1 and ξ(z∗) = 2 and y∗, z∗ ∈ Nx and y
∗ ∈ Nz∗ .
The rest of the proof is divided into two steps depending on the transition.
Transition 1→ 2 – Assume that ξ(x) = ζ2(x) = 1. Then,
φ(y | ξ(y) = 1) ≤M+ and φ(y | ξ(y) = 2) ≥ m+ for all y ∈ Nx.
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In addition, we have φ(y∗, ξ) ≤M− therefore
p1→2(x, ξ) ≥
m+N2
(N1 − 1)M+ +M− +m+N2
=
m+N2
(m+ −M+)N2 + (N − 1)M+ +M−
.
(27)
Now, for all z ∈ [0, N ], we define the functions
g1(z) :=
m+ z
(m+ −M+) z + (N − 1)M+ +M−
and h1(z) :=
(1− ǫ) z
N
+ ǫ.
Since (N − 1)m+ > (N − 2)M+ +M−,
g1(1) =
m+
m+ + (N − 2)M+ +M−
>
1
N
. (28)
We then distinguish two cases.
Case 1 – When M+ > m+, it follows from (28) that
g1(z) ≥ g1(1) z > z/N for all z ∈ [1, N − 1]
therefore g1(z) ≥ h1(z) for all ǫ > 0 small by continuity.
Case 2 – When M+ ≤ m+, the function g1 is concave down. Moreover,
g1(1) ≥
1
N
+
(
1−
1
N
)
ǫ = h1(1)
for all ǫ > 0 small according to (28), while
g1(N) =
Nm+
Nm+ −M+ +M−
≥ 1 = h1(N).
This again implies that g1 dominates h1 for all ǫ > 0 small (see Figure 4 for a picture).
Recalling (27), we deduce that, in both cases and when (26) holds,
p1→2(x, ξ) ≥ g1(N2) ≥ h1(N2) = c1→2(x, ζ
2)
which proves the first inequality in (19).
Transition 2→ 1 – Assume that ξ(x) = ζ2(x) = 2. Then,
φ(y | ξ(y) = 1) ≤M− and φ(y | ξ(y) = 2) ≥ m− for all y ∈ Nx.
In addition, we have φ(z∗, ξ) ≥ m+ therefore
p2→1(x, ξ) ≤
M−N1
M−N1 + (N2 − 1)m− +m+
=
M−N1
(M− −m−)N1 + (N − 1)m− +m+
.
(29)
Death-birth updating process 19
Now, for all z ∈ [0, N ], we define the functions
g2(z) :=
M− z
(M− −m−) z + (N − 1)m− +m+
and h2(z) :=
(1− ǫ) z
N
.
Since (N − 1)M− < (N − 2)m− +m+ ≤ (N − 1)m+,
g2(1) =
M−
M− + (N − 2)m− +m+
<
1
N
g2(N − 1) =
(N − 1)M−
(N − 1)M− +m+
< 1−
1
N
.
(30)
As before, we distinguish two cases.
Case 1 – When M− > m−, it follows from (30) that
g2(z) ≤ g2(1) z < z/N for all z ∈ [1, N − 1]
therefore g2(z) ≤ h2(z) for all ǫ > 0 small by continuity.
Case 2 – When M− ≤ m−, the function g2 is concave up. Moreover,
g2(N − 1) ≥ (1− 1/N)(1 − ǫ) = h2(N − 1) for ǫ > 0 small
g2(0) = h2(0) = 0
where the first inequality follows from (30). This again implies that h2 dominates g2 for all ǫ > 0
small, and we refer to the right-hand side of Figure 4 for a picture.
Recalling (29), we deduce that, in both cases and when (26) holds,
p2→1(x, ξ) ≤ g2(N1) ≤ h2(N1) = c2→1(x, ζ
2)
which proves the second inequality in (19).
This completes the proof. 
To complete the proof of Theorem 2, the last step is to re-express the condition in the previous
lemma using the payoff coefficients.
Lemma 11 – Assume that a12 < a21. Then (25) holds whenever
(N2 −N − 1) max (a11 − a21, a12 − a22, a11 − a22) < a21 − a12. (31)
Proof. We distinguish four cases depending on the sign of a11 − a12 and a22 − a21.
Case 1 – When a11 < a12 and a22 > a21, we have
M+ =M− = a12 and m− = m+ = a21
therefore (25) holds if and only if a12 < a21, which is true by assumption.
Case 2 – When a11 > a12 and a22 > a21, we have
M+ = a11, M− = a11 + (1/N)(a12 − a11), m− = m+ = a21.
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Figure 4. Picture related to the proof of Lemma 10.
Using some basic algebra, we deduce that (25) holds if and only if
(N2 −N − 1)(a11 − a21) < a21 − a12 and (N − 1)(a11 − a21) < a21 − a12
therefore (25) holds if and only if (N2 −N − 1)(a11 − a21) < a21 − a12.
Case 3 – Assume that a11 < a12 and a22 < a21. This case can be deduced from the previous one
by symmetry exchanging the role of the two strategies, and we find that
(25) holds if and only if (N2 −N − 1)(a12 − a22) < a21 − a12.
Case 4 – When a11 > a12 and a22 < a21, it is easier to prove the result graphically and we refer
to the phase diagram of Figure 1 for an illustration of some of the arguments of the proof. In this
case, the minimum and maximum payoffs are given by
M+ = a11 and M− = a11 + (1/N)(a12 − a11)
m− = a22 and m+ = a22 + (1/N)(a21 − a22)
so the two inequalities in (25) are respectively equivalent to
(N − 1)2 a22 > (N
2 −N − 1) a11 + a12 − (N − 1) a21
(N − 1)2 a11 < (N
2 −N − 1) a22 + a21 − (N − 1) a12.
(32)
Since in addition a11 > a12 and a22 < a21, this specifies two triangles with two common sides, one
vertical side and one horizontal side that intersect at point
p := (a12, a21) in the a11 − a22 plane.
For the first inequality in (32), the third side of the triangle is the segment line going through
point p+ and with slope s+ where
p+ := (a21 + (N
2 −N − 1)−1 (a21 − a12), a21)
s+ := (N
2 −N − 1)(N − 1)−2 = 1 + (N − 2)(N − 1)−2 > 1.
(33)
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Using some obvious symmetry, one finds that the third side of the triangle specified by the second
inequality in (32) is characterized by the point and slope
p− := (a12, a12 − (N
2 −N − 1)−1 (a21 − a12)) and s− = 1/s+ < 1. (34)
Since the segment line connecting p− and p+ has slope one, the triangle (p, p−, p+) is contained
in the intersection of the two triangles specified by (33)–(34). In particular, whenever the payoff
coefficients are in this triangle, which is equivalent to
a11 > a12 and a22 < a21 and (N
2 −N − 1)(a11 − a22) < a21 − a12,
the two inequalities in (32) hold.
Since all four cases hold simultaneously when (31) holds, the proof is complete. 
Theorem 2.b directly follows from Lemmas 10 and 11.
4. Coupling with a pure growth process
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 3 which states that, the other payoffs being fixed,
strategy 1 wins whenever the payoff coefficient a11 is sufficiently large. The intuition behind this
result, which is also the first step of the proof, is to observe that, in the limit as a11 goes to
infinity, type 1 players with at least one neighbor of their own type never change their strategy.
In particular, the set of type 1 players dominates a Richardson model [18], i.e., a contact process
with no death, which obviously implies that strategy 1 wins. Using a block construction and the
fact that the transition rates are continuous functions of the payoffs, we deduce that the process
reaches an equilibrium with a density of type 1 close to one when a11 is finite but large. The rest
of the proof consists in showing that we can indeed convert the remaining type 2 players, which
directly follows from percolation results already established in [7, 12].
To turn our sketch into a rigorous proof, we let ζt be the d-dimensional Richardson model with
parameter µ. In this spin system, each vertex of the d-dimensional integer lattice is either empty
or occupied by a particle. Each particle produces a new particle which is then sent to a neighbor
chosen uniformly at random at rate µ. This results in either an empty site becoming empty or two
particles coalescing in case the target site is already occupied. In addition, occupied sites remain
occupied forever. More formally, using the usual notation 0 for empty and 1 for occupied, the
transition rates of the process at vertex x are given by
c0→1(x, ζ) = µ f1(x, ζ) and c1→0(x, ζ) = 0.
In order to compare the process properly rescaled in space and time with oriented site percolation,
we also introduce the space-time regions
BK := [−K,K]
d and BK(z) := Kz +BK for all z ∈ Z
d.
Then, we have the following lemma, where the processes under consideration have been identified
to the set of vertices in state 1 to lighten the expressions.
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Lemma 12 – For all a, ǫ > 0 there exist A,K, c <∞ such that
P (B2K 6⊂ ξt for some t ∈ (cK, 2cK) |BK ⊂ ξ0) ≤ ǫ
whenever max (a21, a22) ≤ a and a11 > A.
Proof. To begin with, we note that
φ(x, ξ) ≥ a11N1(x, ξ) ≥ a11 when x ∈ ξ and f1(x, ξ) 6= 0
φ(x, ξ) ≤ (2M + 1)d max (a21, a22) when x /∈ ξ
from which it follows that, as a11 →∞,
p1→2(x, ξ) → 0 when f1(x, ξ) 6= 0
p2→1(x, ξ) → 1 when f1(x, ξ) f2(x, ξ) 6= 0 for some y ∈ Nx.
(35)
Looking now at the Richardson model, we observe that, because there is no death and because each
particle newly created must be in the neighborhood of its parent, the set of occupied sites satisfies
the following connectivity property:
x ∈ ζt implies that f1(x, ξt) 6= 0 for all times t (36)
provided this holds at time zero. Combining (35)–(36) and using that the set BK is connected, we
deduce that the death-birth process can be coupled with the Richardson model with parameter one
in such a way that, for all fixed K, c > 0,
P (B2K ∩ ζt 6⊂ B2K ∩ ξt for some t ∈ (cK, 2cK) | ζ0 = ξ0 = BK)→ 0 (37)
as a11 →∞. In addition, it directly follows from the shape theorem [18] for the Richardson model
that there exists a positive constant c > 0 such that
P (B2K 6⊂ ζt for some t ∈ (cK, 2cK) | BK ⊂ ζ0)
= P (B2K 6⊂ ζcK | BK ⊂ ζ0) ≤ P (B2K 6⊂ ζcK | ζ0 = {0}) ≤ ǫ/2
(38)
for all K large. Now, fix K, c > 0 such that (38) holds. Since the transition rates of the death-birth
updating process are continuous with respect to the payoff coefficients and since the space-time
region in the event in (37) is finite, there is A <∞ such that
P (B2K ∩ ζt 6⊂ B2K ∩ ξt for some t ∈ (cK, 2cK) | ζ0 = ξ0 = BK) ≤ ǫ/2 (39)
for all a11 > A. Combining (38)–(39), we conclude that
P (B2K 6⊂ ξt for some t ∈ (cK, 2cK) |BK ⊂ ξ0)
≤ P (B2K 6⊂ ζt for some t ∈ (cK, 2cK) | BK ⊂ ζ0)
+ P (B2K ∩ ζt 6⊂ B2K ∩ ξt for some t ∈ (cK, 2cK) | ζ0 = ξ0 = BK)
≤ ǫ/2 + ǫ/2 = ǫ
for all a11 > A. This completes the proof. 
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From the lemma, we deduce that, starting from a product measure with a positive density of
type 1 players, the density of type 1 at equilibrium is close to one when a11 is large. To prove this,
we consider as previously the directed graph H with vertex set
H := {(z, n) ∈ Zd × Z+ : z1 + z2 + · · ·+ zd + n is even}
and in which there is an edge (z, n)→ (z′, n′) if and only if
z′ = z ± ej for some j = 1, 2, . . . , d and n
′ = n+ 1.
Then, calling (z, n) ∈ H an occupied site when
BK(z) ⊂ ξt for all t ∈ cnK + (0, cK)
it follows from Lemma 12 that, for all ǫ > 0, one can choose a11 large enough so that the set of
occupied sites dominates stochastically the set of wet sites in the percolation process where sites
are closed with probability ǫ. Since the probability ǫ can be made arbitrarily small, the density of
type 1 players at equilibrium can be made arbitrarily close to one.
The last step is to turn the remaining type 2 players into type 1 players. To do this, the basic idea
is to rely on the lack of percolation of the dry (not wet) sites for a certain oriented site percolation
process where sites are closed with a sufficiently small probability ǫ. The fact that the set of dry
sites does not percolate for small positive ǫ is proved in [7, section 3] for the percolation process
described above. This result, however, is not sufficient to conclude because the lack of percolation
of the dry sites for this percolation process does not imply extinction of strategy 2. To solve the
problem, we consider oriented site percolation on a directed graph H+ that has the same vertex
set as before but additional arrows, namely
(z, n)→ (z′, n′) if and only if
z′ = z ± ej for some j = 1, 2, . . . , d and n
′ = n+ 1
or z′ = z ± 2ej for some j = 1, 2, . . . , d and n
′ = n.
The process on H+ has the following two key properties:
1. As for the process on H , the dry sites do not percolate if sites are closed with a small enough
probability ǫ > 0. This is proved in [12, section 3] following the ideas in [7].
2. Recalling that the death-birth process and the percolation process on H are coupled in such
a way that the set of occupied sites dominates the set of wet sites, if
ξt(x) = 2 for some (x, t) ∈ BK(z)× (cnK, c(n + 1)K)
then site (z, n) can be reached by a directed path of dry sites embedded in H+. This second
property is also established in [12, section 3]. Even though the proof applies to another model,
it easily extends to the death-birth process because it only relies on the fact that a type 2
player can only appear in the neighborhood of a type 2 player.
To deduce extinction of strategy 2, we first fix ǫ > 0 small such that the set of dry sites does not
percolate for the percolation process on the directed graph H+. Then, we take a11 large enough
so that the set of occupied sites dominates the set of wet sites in the percolation process on the
smaller directed graph H . Finally, it follows from the second property above that, because the dry
sites do not percolate, the type 2 players do not survive.
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5. The prisoner’s dilemma in one dimension
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 4 which focuses on the one-dimensional death-birth
process with nearest neighbor interactions. First, we explain how D3 and D4 in the statement of
the theorem are obtained. To do so, we let
pi(n1, n2) := the rate at which a type i player with
one type 1 neighbor that has n1 type 1 neighbors and
one type 2 neighbor that has n2 type 2 neighbors
update her strategy
for i = 1, 2 and n1, n2 = 0, 1, 2, and note that
p1(n1, n2) =
(2− n2) a21 + n2 a22
n1 a11 + (2− n1) a12 + (2− n2) a21 + n2 a22
p2(n1, n2) =
n1 a11 + (2− n1) a12
n1 a11 + (2− n1) a12 + (2− n2) a21 + n2 a22
.
Now, for the process starting with only 2s to the left of the origin, we let
Xt := inf {x ∈ Z : ξt(x) = 2} − 1 and Kt := inf {x > 0 : ξt(x+Xt) = 1}
be the position of the rightmost type 1 player with only type 1 players to her left and the distance
between this type 1 player and the closest type 1 player to her right. Then, letting
Dj(ξt) := limh→ 0 h
−1E (Xt+h −Xt | ξt and Kt = j)
we have the following almost sure estimates
1 1 1 2 1
· · · • • • ◦ • × × D2(ξt) = D2 = 2− p1(2, 0)
1 1 1 2 2 1
· · · • • • ◦ ◦ • × D3(ξt) = D3 = p2(1, 1) − p1(2, 1)
1 1 1 2 2 2
· · · • • • ◦ ◦ ◦ × Dj(ξt) = D4 = p2(1, 2) − p1(2, 1)
for all j > 3 and where × means type 1 or type 2. In particular, D3 and D4 are possible drifts of
the interface at Xt depending on its distance to the next type 1 player. Before studying the process
starting from general initial configurations, we look at the process starting from configurations that
have a finite interval of type 1 players, only type 2 players to the left of this interval and infinitely
many players of each type to the right. In picture, this looks like
2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2
· · · ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ • • • • • ◦ × × × · · ·
For the process starting from this configuration, we let
Z−t := inf {x ∈ Z : ξt(x) = 1} and Mt := inf {x > 0 : ξt(x+ Z
−
t ) = 2}
be the position of the leftmost type 1 player and the distance between this type 1 player and the
closest type 2 player to her right. Then, we have the following result.
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Lemma 13 – Assume that a22 < a21 and D3 +D4 > 0. Then,
P (Mt > 3 for all t > 0 and Mt →∞|M0 > 3) ≥ c for some c > 0.
Proof. To begin with, we let Zt := e
−aMt where a > 0 and
Φj(a) := limh→ 0 h
−1E (Zt+h − Zt | ξt and Mt > 3 and Kt = j)
for all j > 1. To study these quantities, we let
Z+t := Z
−
t +Mt − 1 and Kt := inf {x > 0 : ξt(x+Xt) = 1}
be the right boundary of the type 1 interval starting at Z−t and the distance between this type 1
player and the closest type 1 player to her right. Then, we have
limh→ 0 h
−1 P (Z+t+h = Z
+
t + 1 | ξt and Mt > 3 and Kt = 3) = p2(1, 1)
limh→ 0 h
−1 P (Z+t+h = Z
+
t − 1 | ξt and Mt > 3 and Kt = 3) = p1(2, 1)
(40)
with probability one, while for the left boundary Z−t ,
limh→ 0 h
−1 P (Z−t+h = Z
−
t + 1 | ξt and Mt > 3) = p1(2, 1)
limh→ 0 h
−1 P (Z−t+h = Z
−
t − 1 | ξt and Mt > 3) = p2(1, 2).
(41)
Since Mt = Z
+
t − Z
−
t + 1, it follows from (40)–(41) that
Φ3(a) := limh→ 0 h
−1E (Zt+h − Zt | ξt and Mt > 3 and Kt = 3)
= Zt (e
−a − 1) limh→ 0 h
−1 P (Mt+h −Mt = 1 |Mt > 3 and Kt = 3)
+ Zt (e
a − 1) limh→ 0 h
−1 P (Mt+h −Mt = −1 |Mt > 3 and Kt = 3)
= (e−a − 1)(p2(1, 1) + p2(1, 2))Zt + 2 (e
a − 1) p1(2, 1)Zt
therefore, taking the derivative at a = 0, we get
Φ′3(0) = −(p2(1, 1) + p2(1, 2))Zt + 2 p1(2, 1)Zt = −(D3 +D4)Zt.
Using the same approach, we prove in general that
Φ′j(0) = −(Dj∧4 +D4)Zt ≤ −(D3 +D4)Zt < 0 for all j > 1
since D3 < D4 < D2 when a22 < a21. In particular,
Φj(b) ≤ Φj(0) = 0 for some b > 0 fixed from now on
showing that, as long as Mt > 3, the process Zt is a supermartingale with respect to the natural
filtration of the death-birth process. To conclude, we now apply the optional stopping theorem to
this supermartingale using the stopping times
τ3 := inf {t :Mt ≤ 3} and τn := inf {t :Mt ≥ n} for all n > 2.
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Since Tn := min(τ3, τn) is finite, whenever M0 > 3,
e−4b ≥ E (Z0) ≥ E (ZTn)
≥ E (ZTn |Tn = τ3)P (Tn = τ3) + E (ZTn |Tn = τn)P (Tn = τn)
≥ e−3b (1− P (Tn = τn)) + e
−nb P (Tn = τn).
(42)
Since the event {Tn = τn} is nonincreasing with respect to n for the inclusion, we also deduce from
the monotone convergence theorem that
P (Mt > 3 for all t > 0 and Mt →∞)
≥ P (Tn = τn for all n > 3) = limn→∞ P (Tn = τn).
(43)
Combining (42)–(43), we deduce that
P (Mt > 3 for all t > 0 and Mt →∞|M0 > 3)
≥ limn→∞ P (Tn = τn) ≥ limn→∞ (e
−3b − e−4b)(e−3b − e−nb)−1
≥ (e−3b − e−4b) e3b = 1− e−b
therefore the lemma holds for c := 1− e−b > 0. 
To deal with the process starting from product measures, we note that every realization induces a
partition of the space-time universe into type 1 and type 2 connected components. More precisely,
assuming that there is initially a type 2 at the origin, we define the type 2 connected component
starting at the origin as
C0 := {(x, t) ∈ Z× R+ : there is a path (0, 0) →2 (x, t) going forward}
where (0, 0)→2 (x, t) means that there are times and vertices
0 = t1 < t2 < · · · < tn+1 = t and 0 = x1, x2, . . . , xn = x
such that the following condition is satisfied:
(ξs(xj) = 2 for all tj ≤ s ≤ tj+1) holds for j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Then, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 14 – Assume that a22 < a21 and D3 +D4 > 0. Then,
T := inf {t > 0 : C0 ∩ (Z × (t,∞)) = ∅} <∞ with probability one.
Proof. We proceed by contradiction, showing that when A := {T = ∞} occurs, its complement
occurs with probability one. To begin with, note that
• on the event A, the type 2 connected component C0 is unbounded and
• since there are infinitely many type 1 players on both sides of the origin at time zero, this
property remains true at all times.
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≤ −D3 ≥ D3D4 −D4
Figure 5. Picture related to the proof of Lemma 14.
From these two observations, we deduce that
0 < card {x ∈ Z : (x, t) ∈ C0} <∞ for all t ∈ (0,∞)
which, in turn, implies that the left boundary lt and right boundary rt of the type 2 connected
component satisfy the following properties at all times:
−∞ < lt := inf {x ∈ Z : (x, t) ∈ C0}
≤ sup {x ∈ Z : (x, t) ∈ C0} =: rt <∞.
We also observe that
M−t := inf {x > 0 : ξt(lt − x) = 2} > 1
M+t := inf {x > 0 : ξt(rt + x) = 2} > 1.
(44)
Figure 5 gives an illustration of these processes. Now, the evolution rules of the death-birth updating
process clearly imply that there exist c1, c2 > 0 such that
P (min (M−t+1,M
+
t+1) > 3 | min (M
−
t ,M
+
t ) > 1) ≥ c1
P (T < t+ 1 | rt − lt ≤ 3) ≥ c2
(45)
while it follows from Lemma 13 that
P (inf {t > s : min (M−t ,M
+
t ) ≤ 3}
≥ inf {t > s : rt − lt ≤ 3} | min (M
−
s ,M
+
s ) > 3) ≥ c
2 > 0.
(46)
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Combining (44)–(46), we conclude that
A = {T =∞} occurs implies that min (M−t ,M
+
t ) > 1 at all times
implies that min (M−t ,M
+
t ) > 3 infinitely often
implies that rt − lt ≤ 3 infinitely often
implies that T <∞ with probability one.
This completes the proof. 
Lemma 15 – Assume that a22 > a21 and D4 > 0. Then,
T := inf {t > 0 : C0 ∩ (Z × (t,∞)) = ∅} <∞ with probability one.
Proof. First, we note that the conclusion of Lemma 13 holds as well under the assumptions of the
present lemma, since whenever a22 > a21 we have
D4 < D3 < D2 and Dj∧4 +D4 ≥ 2D4 for all j > 1.
In particular, the lemma follows by repeating the proof of Lemma 14. 
Under the assumptions of Theorem 4 and conditional on the origin being initially occupied by
a type 2 player, it follows from Lemmas 14–15 that the type 2 connected starting at the origin is
bounded with probability one. Since in addition the number of players is countable,
P (strategy 2 wins) = P (ξ0(x) = 2 and Tx =∞ for some x ∈ Z)
≤
∑
x:ξ0(x)=2
P (Tx =∞) = 0
where Tx denotes the time at which the connected component starting at vertex x dies out, as
defined in the statement of Lemmas 14–15. This proves Theorem 4.
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